Beyond the Orange Pass: How Federal Lobbying Reforms Impact Corporate Advocacy - August Update

‍This week's Four Corners episode, "Access All Areas," looked at lobbying culture in Canberra — orange passes, industry access, and the relationships between government and outside interests. Reform to Australia's lobbying rules has been moving in stages for the past two years. Here's where things currently stand: the federal framework, the 2024 Senate inquiry, the APH pass reforms that took effect this year, the Pocock–Ryan bill, where each party sits and how GR teams should be preparing to adapt.

Why does this matter?

For government relations teams the impacts are direct: the pass reforms already apply to anyone holding parliamentary access on your organisation's behalf, and the definitional fight over "in-house lobbyist" determines whether your GR function moves from unregulated to registered and transparent.

This isn't background reading; it's a compliance position worth mapping now.

The federal baseline

‍At the Commonwealth level, lobbying is governed by the Lobbying Code of Conduct, which describes lobbying as "a legitimate activity and an important part of the democratic process." It is administered by the Attorney-General's Department (AGD) and underpinned by the Register of Lobbyists. The Code applies to third-party lobbyists contacting a "Government representative" defined as Ministers, Assistant Ministers, their staff, and public servants. It does not cover in-house lobbyists, and it does not relate to contact with backbenchers, opposition MPs or independents.

‍Registered lobbyists must disclose their identifying details, any previous government roles, and their clients. Government representatives can't knowingly deal with an unregistered lobbyist, and must report suspected breaches to the AGD Secretary, who can remove a lobbyist from the register: that's the main sanction under the scheme. The Code also sits alongside the Ministerial Code of Conduct, so a serious breach by a minister could (in theory) impact their future in the role.

‍In 2018, the Australian National Audit Office found that the Register alone doesn't give visibility into the substance of contact between lobbyists and government — it shows who's registered, not what was discussed or how often.‍ ‍

The 2024 Senate inquiry

‍In May 2024, the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee, chaired by Liberal Senator Richard Colbeck, tabled its report on lobbyist access to Parliament House. ‍The report found that Commonwealth lobbying regulation "has not kept pace with best-practice developments in other jurisdictions" and "could be usefully amended to improve its effectiveness." It also emphasised lobbying's legitimacy as a "longstanding and legitimate feature of democratic governance" that nonetheless "has the potential to be a corrosive force" where private interests operate without transparency.

‍The inquiry looked closely at the sponsored "orange pass" system that so many of us utilise: unescorted access to Parliament House's private areas, granted to people with "significant and regular business" there. At the time, there were just under 2,000 orange passholders. The committee found the process for obtaining a pass "not entirely transparent," and said the existing arrangements made it "impossible to ascertain the scale of lobbyist access" to Parliament House.

‍Its recommendations were narrower than some evidence to the inquiry had called for: exploring "regulatory interoperability" between the Lobbying Code and the parliamentary pass system, reintroducing an unescorted day pass for people who need only occasional access, and commissioning a further independent review of the Code including who should administer and enforce it. ‍The Centre for Public Integrity and crossbench MPs, including Senator Pocock, said the report stopped short of recommending mandatory disclosure of who holds sponsored passes. The government did not table a formal written response to the report.

The June 2026 parliamentary pass reforms

‍Some of the issues raised in the Senate Inquiry, particularly around pass transparency, have since been addressed through access reforms. In March 2026, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese asked the House and Senate Presiding Officers (Milton Dick and Sue Lines) to review Parliament House's private-area access policy. That review concluded in June 2026, with changes taking effect from 1 July 2026:

  • The old single “orange pass” sponsored category has been split into three: Federal Registered Lobbyist (third-party lobbyists bound by the Lobbying Code of Conduct, who keep the orange pass), Commercial (in-house lobbyists employed by a business or for-profit organisation), and Advocacy and Community (charities, religious organisations, not-for-profits, unions and peak/member bodies).

  • A one-off processing fee of $140.80 (including GST) now applies to Federal Registered Lobbyist and Commercial applicants. Advocacy and Community applicants are exempt from the fee, which will be reviewed annually by the Presiding Officers.

  • All three sponsored categories now require two sponsoring parliamentarians — a primary sponsor, responsible for the cardholder’s ongoing conduct, and a secondary sponsor — with both names published quarterly alongside the cardholder’s organisation.

  • Access hours for all three sponsored categories are now capped at 5:00am–11:00pm, Monday to Friday, removing the previous 24/7 access some passholders held. All existing sponsored cardholders must reapply by 31 October 2026 including those remaining in the same category.

‍The Presiding Officers told parliamentarians the changes "strengthen the transparency and oversight of access passes issued to individuals who have privileged access to Parliament House." Senator Pocock, who ran his own voluntary pass-disclosure register while the review was underway, called the changes "a huge win for community and crossbench advocacy," and said the remaining gaps are alignment between in-house and third-party lobbyist obligations, and cooling-off periods for senior staff moving into lobbying roles.

The Pocock–Ryan bill

‍In September 2025, Senator Pocock introduced the Lobbying (Improving Government Honesty and Trust) Bill 2025 as a private senator's bill, drafted with Member for Kooyong Dr Monique Ryan, who first introduced a version of the bill in the House. Dr Ryan said the existing code "is toothless and it has failed," arguing that "lobbying leads to corruption if it prompts decision-making that is not merit-based, honest and transparent." Its main provisions:

‍Ø  Expand the definition of "lobbyist" to include in-house government relations staff, industry associations, and consultants with access to decision-makers — not just registered third-party consultants.‍ ‍

Ø  Legislate the Lobbying Code of Conduct, turning it from administrative policy into law with graduated, enforceable penalties. Current sanctions are limited to removal from the register or a short suspension.‍ ‍

Ø  Require quarterly public reporting of lobbyist meetings with decision-makers, covering who, how long, and the general subject.‍ ‍

Ø  Publish ministerial diaries, so the public can cross-check disclosed lobbying against actual meeting records — already standard practice in NSW, Victoria and the ACT.‍ ‍

Ø  Introduce a three-year cooling-off period before ministers and senior political staff can take lobbying roles connected to their former portfolios.‍ ‍

Ø  Move oversight to the National Anti-Corruption Commission, instead of the AGD, which currently both administers and polices the scheme.

‍The government has not supported the bill. Labor Senator Lisa Darmanin pointed to reforms already delivered such as updates to the Code and the pass system as the government's preferred path, rather than a full legislative rewrite. A spokesperson for Attorney-General Michelle Rowland has separately said the government remains "committed to upholding a high standard of integrity, transparency and accountability," including ensuring lobbying is "carried out ethically and transparently," while noting that lobbying itself is "a legitimate and important part of the democratic process" and that "the government regularly reviews the policy settings for the code."‍ ‍

States and territories

‍Significant elements of healthcare policy contact runs through state health departments as much as through Canberra, so state rules matter for day-to-day compliance.‍ ‍

Queensland is widely regarded as having one of Australia's most comprehensive lobbying frameworks, following three independent reviews between 2021 and 2023 that fed into a strengthened 2024 framework: proactive ministerial diary disclosure, a two-year cooling-off period, mandatory lobbyist training, a ban on "dual hatting" as both lobbyist and political campaigner, and independent oversight by the Queensland Integrity Commissioner, who can penalise unregistered lobbying. ‍ ‍

South Australia and NSW also rank well on independent scorecards; NSW additionally requires lobbyists to disclose the clients they represent. WA, Victoria and Tasmania sit in the middle. The ACT and Northern Territory currently have no dedicated lobbyist register. Anti-corruption bodies in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and SA have separately proposed further reforms, including broadening what counts as lobbying and extending registers to cover fundraisers and networking events.‍ ‍

No Australian jurisdiction currently requires corporate in-house government relations teams to register and disclose lobbying activity in the same way as external consultant lobbyists. Victoria and NSW have moved furthest towards recognising in-house advocacy within their regulatory frameworks, but neither has adopted a universal registration and reporting regime. ‍ ‍

Victoria's lobbying framework is unusual in expressly recognising "Government Affairs Directors" (as opposed to third party lobbyists) acting “in a paid capacity of an organisation or business or professional or trade association.” However, Victoria only requires Government Affairs Directors to register or report lobbying activity if they have previously held a senior position in a registered political party, are a former Minister or Parliamentary Secretary or have been a senior staffer to one.‍ ‍

NSW does not require in-house government relations professionals to register as lobbyists, however its Lobbyists Code of Conduct defines lobbying broadly enough to encompass people advocating on behalf of their employer or organisation, meaning in-house advocacy is recognised within the regulatory framework even though it is not subject to a comprehensive registration and public disclosure regime.‍ ‍

Where the parties and crossbench sit

‍Labor and the Coalition have generally supported further review of the federal lobbying framework, including consideration of a broader definition of lobbyist, but neither has committed to extending registration requirements to all in-house government relations professionals. Labor has delivered transparency changes through the existing administrative framework but has not supported legislating the Code. The Coalition, through Senator Colbeck's chairing of the 2024 inquiry, backed a further independent review of the Code without committing to a broader legal definition of lobbyist or NACC oversight.‍ ‍

The Greens have been strong parliamentary advocates for expanding lobbying regulation to cover in-house lobbyists. In its additional comments to the 2024 Senate inquiry, the party argued that any expanded definition of lobbyist "must explicitly include in-house lobbyists" and should focus on the act of influencing government decision-making, regardless of whether it is carried out by a consultant or an employee of the organisation seeking influence. Speaking in support of the Pocock–Ryan bill, Greens Senator Steph Hodgins-May said the current regime gives certain interests "disproportionate access to decision-making through a weak code of conduct, with minimal to no consequences for poor behaviour," noting that over 700 registered lobbyists operate "with minimal scrutiny."‍ ‍

The crossbench, led by Senator Pocock and Dr Ryan, has pushed the legislative reform agenda hardest, and its campaigning is widely credited with prompting the June 2026 pass changes, even though the Pocock–Ryan bill itself remains unsupported by government.‍ ‍

Implications

‍The in-house/third-party distinction is the biggest open question. If reform proposals to broaden the definition of lobbyist gain traction, many in-house government affairs teams could face federal registration and reporting obligations for the first time. While no Australian jurisdiction currently requires all in-house lobbyists to register and publicly disclose their activities, Victoria already imposes some transparency obligations on certain in-house government affairs practitioners, and several reform proposals would move further in that direction. To date the Albanese Government has not expressed support for this idea and their approach to reform has been incremental rather than structural.‍ ‍

The new pass register commenced on 1 July 2026: quarterly disclosure of who sponsors which passholder plus the requirement for all existing passholders to reapply for pass renewal by 31 October 2026.‍ ‍

State obligations already exceed the federal floor for most healthcare advocacy, and Queensland's disclosure regime is the highest bar currently in force in any Australian jurisdiction.‍ ‍

Four Corners built its story around the gambling industry's access to government. Healthcare lobbying differs in that much of the sector's engagement concerns patient safety, funding adequacy and access to care rather than commercial interests alone — though that distinction may not always be drawn by the public or media covering future health policy debates, including PBS listings, private health insurance settings, and aged care funding.‍ ‍

What GR teams should be doing now

  1. Reapply before 31 October: every sponsored cardholder, including existing orange passholders remaining in that category, must resubmit under the new two-sponsor framework by 31 October 2026, or access lapses.

  2. Map exposure by jurisdiction: federal rules are narrow, but Queensland, NSW and SA already go much further — audit each state separately, not just Canberra.

  3. Get ahead of the pass register: from 1 July 2026 sponsorships are public and quarterly. Know who holds passes on your behalf and be ready to explain why.

  4. Treat wider coverage as a “when,” not an “if”: in-house teams sit outside the federal register today, but Pocock, Ryan and the Greens are actively pushing to close that gap.

  5. Build disclosure-ready records: log meeting purpose, timing and subject matter now — ministerial diary publication is already standard in three states.

  6. Revisit revolving-door policies: cooling-off periods remain a central plank of every current reform proposal, federal and state.

  7. Lead with voluntary transparency: disclosure is becoming the baseline expectation, not the exception — especially in sensitive sectors like healthcare.

Navigating Federal & State Regulatory Shifts

‍Is your team's compliance framework prepared for expanding state disclosure rules and upcoming APH pass renewals? Bihary Advisory helps corporate and healthcare leaders audit their GR exposure, refine engagement strategies, and build disclosure-ready government relations functions, as well as assisting with a wide range of policy and government relations solutions.

Reach out directly to discuss. Email info@biharyadvisory.com.au for more info.

Thanks for reading!

Josh Bihary

Political Donations Reforms & Risk - June 2026 Update

Executive Summary

Australia’s political donations ecosystem is highly fragmented and undergoing rapid, aggressive overhauls. The implementation of federal reforms has been delayed to January 2027, whilst Victoria’s reforms have been thrown out by the High Court leaving a policy vacuum. Existing political donation rules can range from no caps in some jurisdictions to a total ban in another.

As there is not a stable or uniform national framework, health sector organisations face the potential of disproportionate reputational and legal risks from public exposure of non-compliance due to commercial dependencies (PBS & NIP listings, TGA & MSAC approvals, hospital procurement).

The strictest and lowest risk approach to political donations is to assume total disclosure transparency, apply internal caps stricter than jurisdictional limits or apply the strictest limit nationwide, and manage funded political engagement as a strictly audited compliance function.

Core Strategic Risks

Donors must simultaneously satisfy radically conflicting laws. Disclosure thresholds vary wildly while regimes range from complete donation bans to uncapped, lag-reported environments.

Routine activities such as purchasing corporate event tables, buying political fundraiser tickets, or purchasing political party business forum memberships aggregate annually or semi-annually, potentially inadvertently breaching statutory thresholds if not managed effectively.

Real-time disclosures mean any financial transfer can yield immediate media exposure, leaving corporations open to rapid stakeholder backlash.

Major Federal Reforms

Passed under the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Reform) Act 2025, the new federal regime represents an unprecedented tightening of corporate donation limits and reporting speeds.

Originally scheduled to take effect on 1 July 2026, the Government shifted the operational date to 1 January 2027 to allow the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and corporate entities more time to build necessary compliance and administration systems.

Donors must prepare for four core pillars of change taking effect from January 2027:

1. Lower Disclosure Thresholds

The threshold for a "federal purpose" donation to be disclosed drops from the previous indexed rate of over $17,000 down to a fixed $5,000 (to be indexed only following general elections). This threshold applies cumulatively within a calendar year which is a shift from the previous financial year disclosures. If a donor makes multiple small donations (e.g., purchasing tickets to various political fundraising lunches or policy dinners) that aggregate to more than $5,000 to a single political entity, disclosure obligations are triggered.

2. "Real-Time" Disclosure Obligations

Donations must be disclosed by the 21st day of the month following the donation, marking a shift from a slow annual retrospective model to rolling monthly reporting.

During a federal election campaign (from the issuance of the writs to seven days post-polling), corporate donors must lodge disclosure notices within seven days. As recipients face a 24-hour disclosure window during the final days of an election campaign, corporate donations will effectively become public information in real time.

3. Hard Donation Caps

For the first time federally, absolute limits are placed on corporate contributions per calendar year:

• A maximum of $50,000 can be given to any single recipient (a single political party, independent candidate, Member of Parliament, or significant third party).

• Donations to branches or candidates aggregated within any single state or territory cannot exceed $250,000 (5 times the annual cap).

• An absolute maximum of $1.6 million per donor across all federal political participants.

• Breaching a donation cap carries severe penalties - the greater of 200 penalty units ($66,000) or three times the amount by which the cap was exceeded.

4: Critical Legal Rule: Foreign Donor Prohibition

Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, political entities are strictly barred from accepting electoral contributions from foreign donors. Possessing an Australian Business Number (ABN) alone does NOT make a donation lawful.

To be eligible to make political donations, a corporation must satisfy a substantive legal test demonstrating a genuine Australian operational base. An entity is classified as an authorised donor only if it meets at least one of the following criteria:

1. Incorporated in Australia (Pty Ltd affiliates of foreign parent company are ok);

2. Head office located inside Australia; and/or

3. Principal place of business/activity in Australia.

4. State & Territory Overview

Each State and Territory operates a different system of political donations with varying amounts and timeframes for disclosure and donation caps. On average each year (or change of government) sees at least one jurisdiction update their rules, particularly as technology facilitating real time reporting is embraced.

NSW: Disclosure threshold of $1,000, strict caps of ~$3,800 to parties; ~$3,300 to candidates, and strict bans on property developers, tobacco, liquor, and gambling entities.

QLD: Disclosure threshold of $1,000 with seven-day real time reporting, strict caps of ~$4,930 to parties; ~$7,395 cumulative to all candidates within a single party.

WA: Disclosure threshold of $2,600 with seven-day real time reporting, no caps on donations. Foreign donations banned.

SA: Direct corporate political donations are banned with an exception for newly registered minor parties or independent candidates who don't get public funding (capped at $5,000).

TAS: $5,000 disclosure threshold, no donation caps.

NT: $1500 disclosure threshold, no donation caps.

ACT: Disclosure threshold of $1,000, strict caps of $4,000 per year. Bans on property developers.

VIC: Currently in a legislative void. Historically, Victoria maintained one of the stricter donation caps in the country (approximately $5,000 per donor per four-year election cycle). However, on 15 April 2026, the High Court handed down a unanimous decision invalidating the state's donations framework. As a result, Victoria currently has no legal limits or disclosure requirements governing political donations for state elections.

The Victorian Government has vowed to "immediately move to restore Victoria's electoral integrity regime" ahead of the November 2026 state election. Current negotiations in Parliament show the Government attempting to fast-track a replacement bill that may double the previous donation cap to build a functional stop-gap framework.

Note: Disclosure amounts are often indexed with new amounts applied from 1 July or 1 January depending on the jurisdiction. Please check for latest updates (or contact us) before applying the above threshold limits to your organisation’s disclosure reporting.

5. Suggested Action Items

Corporate donors are recommended to consider implementing the following changes to ensure ongoing compliance and minimise risk.

1. Track all cumulative federal political donations via a rolling monthly monitoring schedule that proactively aligns with the impending 2027 reforms. Implement real-time tracking of all political spending against the new $5,000 cumulative threshold and $50,000 absolute cap.

2. Treat all event tickets, professional memberships, corporate sponsorships, and policy-linked initiatives under the same rigorous standard as direct political donations.

3. Update internal systems to prepare for real time disclosure reporting and to ensure ongoing update of donation cap amounts for each jurisdiction. Set internal caps below statutory minimums to minimise risk and exposure.

4. Form an integrated sign-off protocol linking Corporate Affairs, Legal, and Finance. No business unit may purchase political engagements independently.

5. Operate as though strict donation rules in Victoria are still active. Integrity bodies have called on all parties to agree to retrospective disclosure rules once new laws are passed, which is expected to occur in the coming months. Making large, undisclosed contributions during this ‘window of void’ carries reputational risk and the potential for retroactive compliance penalties.

6. Restrict all corporate political engagements exclusively to Australian-incorporated subsidiaries containing active domestic operations. Never remit political payments from offshore accounts or foreign parent entities.

About Us

Bihary Advisory is a dedicated government relations advisory consultancy operating primarily in the health sector bringing together expertise in both government and industry. We assist organisations from large multinationals to small patient groups to develop strategy, provide advice and lead engagement with policy decision makers.

We also offer a specialised political donation management and internal process audit service to assist corporations to remain compliant with evolving federal, state and territory rules, minimise risk and process real time disclosure reporting obligations.

Email info@biharyadvisory.com.au for more info.

Farrer By-election: A Seismic Shift or Protest Vote? - May 2026

One Nation’s convincing victory in last weekend’s Farrer by-election delivered the party it’s first victory in a House of Representatives seat in its 29-year history. Only the future will determine if this is a one-off or a sign of things to come, but for now the result demonstrates how economic structure, demographic change and political behaviour are now tightly interwoven across regional Australia.

This was not a narrow or accidental upset. One Nation secured over 57% of the two-candidate-preferred vote, driven by a dramatic surge in primary vote support from 6.6% in 2025 to 39.5%. This makes Farrer technically a safe One Nation seat.

At the same time, the Liberal Party’s primary vote collapsed from over 43% to roughly 12% (+10% for the National Party). These are not marginal shifts; they reflect a wholesale realignment.

This was the first election in Australia’s history where no major party ended up in the Two Party Preferred (TPP) vote breakdown. Independent Michelle Milthorpe came in second with 28.4% of the primary vote and 42.5% TPP after preferences were distributed.

Over the coming two years rural and regional MPs will be nervous and commentators will be busy monitoring opinion polls, performing vox pops and reading the tea leaves to try to determine if the Farrer result was a by-election protest or a portent of a structural shift in Australian politics away from the traditional two-party system in line with the recent election of a variety of “Teal” Independents.

The Geography of Discontent

The Farrer result aligns closely with the underlying socio-economic structure of the electorate. Farrer is a large, predominantly rural division spanning more than 126,000 square kilometres, encompassing dispersed agricultural communities and small towns across southern NSW. According to Census data, it has:

  • A median age of 42, higher than both NSW (39) and the national average (38)

  • A comparatively modest median weekly household income of $1,390.

These figures indicate an electorate that is older, less affluent, and more economically exposed to structural change.

Across Australia more broadly, demographic data shows that a disproportionate share of older Australians live outside major cities, with 34% of people aged 65+ residing in rural and regional areas. This ageing trend is particularly pronounced in inland regions, where population decline, natural decrease, and limited inward migration are well-documented structural features.

At the macro level, population growth is also uneven:

  • Capital cities grew by 1.8% in 2024–25

  • Regional Australia grew by just 1.1%

This slower growth is not just a number - it reflects weaker labour market dynamism, lower investment attraction, and reduced service provision. These conditions shape political sentiment.

Albury: A Counterfactual Within the Same Seat

Crucially, Farrer is not homogeneous. The result must be understood through internal contrasts — particularly between smaller towns and regional hubs like Albury.

Albury represents a fundamentally different economic model:

  • Population ~59,500 (2025 estimate)

  • 1.3% annual population growth (2018–23)

  • Gross Regional Product of ~$5.02 billion

  • Unemployment around 4.4%

Its economy is also structurally diversified:

  • Over 50% of output linked to sectors like health care, real estate and services

  • Major employment in healthcare, construction, and education

This is the profile of a modern regional service economy, with stronger institutional bases (hospital, university, logistics networks) and resilience to shocks affecting agriculture or small business alone.

The political consequence is predictable: areas with economic growth, job diversity and population inflow tend to produce different voting behaviours to communities experiencing stagnation or decline.

In the by-election this contrast was reflected in a sharp difference in voting patterns. Voters in Albury gave 40% primary vote to Independent Michelle Milthorpe vs 26.7% to One Nation. In comparison, this switched in the rest of the electorate with non-Albury voters giving 43.5% to One Nation and 25% to Milthorpe.

Economic Structure as Political Driver

The deeper story in Farrer is not simply “cost of living pressure” — although that featured heavily in the campaign — but the interaction between economic structure and perceived opportunity. Research consistently shows:

  • Regional Australia has slower population growth and weaker migration inflows compared to cities

  • Smaller inland towns face ageing populations and service withdrawal risks

While the income story is more nuanced, the lived experience in many agricultural and small-town communities is shaped less by raw income and more by:

  • Limited job diversification

  • Reduced access to services (health, education, infrastructure)

  • Perceptions of long-term decline

The Farrer campaign itself amplified these concerns, particularly around:

  • Healthcare funding

  • Water policy impacts

  • Cost pressures on irrigators

These are highly localised issues that do not resonate strongly in metropolitan electorates but are central to regional political identity.

A Political Realignment

It is tempting to frame this result as a protest. The data suggests something more significant. One Nation did not merely win preferences — it dominated the primary vote, reaching nearly 40%. That level of support indicates: 

  • A consolidation of disaffected conservative voters

  • A transfer of loyalty from the Coalition, not just a temporary swing

This is particularly important given that the Coalition has held Farrer continuously since its formation in 1949. The drop from ~43% primary vote to ~22% (combined) represents not just a temporary dissatisfaction but structural erosion of its voter base. To put this in perspective, over all elections in Farrer from 1949-2025, the average combined primary vote result for Coalition candidates was over 57%.

The unknown issue here is how much of that drop is specific to a by-election not electing the next government (Labor didn’t even run a candidate), therefore giving voters a chance to make a tactical protest vote. Only the next general election will provide clarity on that question.

Implications: A Dividing Australia

The result underscores a broader and increasingly visible pattern:

1. Intra-regional divides matter as much as metro vs regional - Albury’s economic trajectory contrasts sharply with smaller communities in the same electorate. Political behaviour reflects this divergence.

2. Demographics are political destiny - older, slower-growing, less economically diversified communities are more likely to shift toward non-major party alternatives.

3. Economic perception matters more than absolute performance - even where regional incomes are competitive in some areas, perceptions of stagnation, decline, or exclusion from growth are powerful drivers of voting behaviour.

Bottom Line

Farrer is not an anomaly — it is a signal. The economy remains the central organising force of political behaviour, but it is not just about growth or inflation; it is about who benefits from economic change, and who feels left behind.

For the Coalition, the threat in regional Australia is now existential, given evidence of large-scale voter transfer.

For Labor, the lesson is equally clear: economic management must extend beyond macro indicators to visible, place-based outcomes in regional communities.

For One Nation, a new question now surfaces – will they remain a protest against the traditional two-party system or seize this opportunity and present themselves as a legitimate political (and dare I say, policy) alternative? History is not on Pauline Hanson’s side as previous victories have often been quickly followed by in-fighting and defection, however Farrer has certainly shown that history alone can not be relied upon when attempting to divine the future in Australian politics.

Ultimately, Farrer demonstrates that electoral outcomes are increasingly shaped not by ideology alone, but by geography, demography and the uneven distribution of economic opportunity. This shift will continue to benefit minor parties and locally-minded independents compared to the nation-wide approach to policy and campaigning taken by the major parties.

For further analysis of this result or broader questions on Australian politics please contact Josh on info@biharyadvisory.com.au

Outcome of the 2026 South Australian State Election - March 2026

Overview

South Australia’s 2026 state election delivered a historic landslide re‑election for the Labor Government under Premier Peter Malinauskas, while the result was defined by a significant realignment on the conservative side. 

Primary vote shifts (2026 vs 2022)

‍Latest counts indicate the following first‑preference results (approximate figures as votes are still being counted:‍

  • Labor: 38% of the primary vote, a small decline of 2 percentage points from 2022. 

  • Liberal Party: 19%, sharp decline from 35% in 2022. 

  • One Nation: 21%, surging by 19 points from a low 2–3% in 2022.  ‍ ‍

The result marks the first time in SA electoral history that the Liberals fell to third place on the primary vote behind One Nation.  ‍ ‍

Rise of One Nation

One Nation’s dramatic surge—its strongest showing in nearly 30 years—reflects a consolidation of conservative and anti‑establishment sentiment, particularly in regional and outer‑suburban electorates. Although unlikely to secure many lower‑house seats due to preference flows, its influence on the political narrative and the realignment of the right‑wing vote is substantial. 

Decline of the Liberal Party‍ ‍

The Liberals experienced an historic collapse, projected to secure only four lower‑house seats—its worst result since federation. Losses occurred across both metropolitan and regional strongholds, driven by voter drift to Labor in urban areas and to One Nation in the regions. Of note, some Liberal candidates placed fourth or fifth in multiple seats, including in traditional Liberal strongholds, and their vote fragmented due to independents and conservative competitors and a perception of leadership instability and weak policy differentiation with Labor. The Liberals are unlikely to function as an effective opposition in the short term, increasing the policy influence of crossbench and minor parties.‍ ‍

Key health policy priorities of the re‑elected Labor Government‍ ‍

While the election narrative centred on cost‑of‑living and economic stability, Premier Peter Malinauskas reaffirmed an ongoing commitment (as opposed to new campaign promises) to Labor’s health system capacity and access agenda, with improved performance and investment core pillars of his renewed mandate. Specifically:‍ ‍

  • Healthcare workforce expansion – continuing recruitment drives for doctors, nurses and allied health including financial incentives for GPs relocating to SA.‍ ‍

  • Hospital infrastructure upgrades – maintaining investment programs initiated in the first term including expansion of transition care capacity (250 beds).

  • Strengthening emergency care capacity – ongoing reforms targeting ambulance ramping and ED wait times.

  • ‍Preventive health & community care – emphasis on chronic disease prevention, mental health, and early‑intervention services.

  • Strengthening regional access via Patient Assistance Transport Scheme reforms.‍ ‍

Federal implications

  • The scale of Labor’s victory strengthens the political authority of a state premier aligned with the Federal Government, creating smoother intergovernmental cooperation on national health policy.

  • One Nation’s rise—largely driven by cost‑of‑living and healthcare accessibility grievances—may increase federal scrutiny on health equity, regional service gaps, and medicine availability.‍ ‍

  • Stronger state–federal alignment may accelerate coordinated initiatives in digital health, real‑time prescribing, and integrated care trials.

  • State hospital investment supports increased demand forecasting for hospital-based therapies, biologics, and specialty treatments.

  • Political pressure on affordability—with cost‑of‑living a dominant electoral theme—may intensify federal efforts to control medicine prices and expedite generic/biosimilar market entry.

  • Rise of populist sentiment (via One Nation) adds new pressure on health system responsiveness, with potential calls for local manufacturing incentives or supply-chain sovereignty initiatives and added scepticism of large/global institutions (including pharma).

  • Weakening of Liberal brand may influence federal policy positioning, particularly on healthcare funding and PBS settings.

Implications for stakeholder engagement

Pharmaceutical companies should prepare for:‍ ‍

  • Increased emphasis on value for money, health system savings and patient outcomes in negotiations.

  • Heightened appreciation of regional access challenges as a political issue.

  • Opportunities to partner on preventive health, chronic disease management, and workforce‑supporting technologies.

  • A more complex right‑wing landscape, requiring refreshed engagement strategies beyond the traditional Liberal opposition.

  • Increased importance of parliamentary engagement beyond major parties, including crossbench and minor parties.‍ ‍

Bottom line‍ ‍

The 2026 SA Election signals a stable Labor Government but a volatile political landscape, with a weakened traditional opposition and a rising populist force. For the pharmaceutical sector, this increases the importance of multi-party engagement, access-driven messaging, and alignment with public health system priorities.‍‍ ‍

This briefing note was prepared by Bihary Advisory for clients and key stakeholders. Election data was correct at 10am on Monday 23 March 2026. ‍ ‍

Want to find out more? Email info@biharyadvisory.com.au